We show that comments by euro area central bankers contain information on future ECB interest rate decisions, but that the comments mainly reflect recent developments in macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, models using only communication variables are outperformed by straightforward Taylor rule models. During the first years of the European Economic and Monetary Union, comments by ECB Executive Board members and high-level Bundesbank policy-makers were more informative than comments by national central bank presidents. We also find that differences of opinion were informative when they concerned the outlook for economic growth. Finally, our results suggest that the ECB used communication especially to signal interest rate increases.
Introduction
Communication has become a key policy instrument for central bankers. The main benefit of communication is the opportunity to directly influence private sector expectations. There is increasing evidence that central bank communication affects developments in financial markets (see, for example, Kohn and Sack (2003) , Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004) The first aim of this paper is to study these issues. We do this by analysing statements by euro area central bankers during the first years of the
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
The second aim of this paper is to examine the role of disagreement. Jansen and De Haan (2006) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) show that, in recent years, euro area central bankers often voiced contrasting opinions on euro area monetary policy and economic conditions. What, if anything, can market participants learn from these voiced differences of opinion? Does disagreement hamper the markets' understanding of future policy? Or, alternatively, can disagreement be informative? By receiving varying messages, agents may be better able to evaluate the different arguments on which the subsequent decision is based.
A number of recent papers study the relationship between central bank communication and interest rate policy. Pakko (2005) finds that the bias announcements by the Federal Open Market Committee contain useful information for predicting future changes in the federal funds target rate. Lapp and Pearce (2000) reach a similar conclusion with respect to inter-meeting policy changes.
Other studies focus on the European Central Bank (ECB). Gerlach (2004) uses the editorials of the ECB monthly bulletin to construct quantitative indicators of the ECB's assessment of euro area economic conditions. He finds that models incorporating these indicators can better predict policy decisions than models which only include macroeconomic variables. Rosa and Verga (2005) find that ECB communication can explain changes in market expectations of future policy. This conclusion is based on an analysis of the introductory statements by the ECB president at the press conferences after interest rate decisions. Heinemann and Ullrich (2005) construct an indicator based on the same statements and show that an analysis of ECB rhetoric can improve, but not substitute a Taylor rule model in predicting interest rate changes 1 .
Central banks communicate using various channels, such as press confer- The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses our methodology, while section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents the ordered probit regression results, whereas section 5 discusses the predictive power of different specifications. Section 6 has results for the decomposed communication.
Section 7 gives our conclusions.
Methodology

Communication and interest rate decisions
How do agents form expectations of future interest rate decisions? A logical step would be to use the rule suggested by Taylor (1993) to analyse the relationship between decisions and macroeconomic developments. According to the Taylor rule, the interest rate that the central bank targets (i * t ) is a linear function of inflation (π t ), the equilibrium real interest rate (r * ), the difference between actual inflation and target inflation (π t − π * ) and the output gap y t . As the ECB attributes an important role to developments in the money supply, it makes sense to include the difference between actual money growth and the target level for the growth of the money supply (m t −m * ) in the Taylor rule (see also Gerlach (2004) and Heinemann and Ullrich (2005) ). The target interest rate is defined as follows:
Judd and Rudebusch (1998) suggest to allow for a smooth adjustment of the actual interest rate to the target level:
By substituting equation (1) into equation (2) and re-writing, we obtain:
where
As the ECB changes interest rates in steps that are multiples of 25 basis points we use ordered probit models. We model the interest rate decision ∆i t as a ternary variable which has the value 0 if interest rates were kept constant, +1 if interest rates were raised and -1 if interest rates were lowered 3 . Using (3) we specify an index function as follows:
where ∆i * t is a latent continuous random variable representing the preferred interest rate change. We assume that the policy decision is characterised by threshold behaviour: the central bank will change the interest rate if ∆i * t passes two unobservable thresholds τ 1 and τ 2 :
Assuming that t follows a standard normal distribution, we can write the probabilities of the different outcomes as follows:
3 Our analysis focuses on the direction of the interest rate changes. One could also take the size of the changes into account, but, in our case, we would be left with low numbers of observations in the respective categories. 
where S x t denotes the signal indicator on interest rates, inflation, economic growth and M3, respectively and t ∼ N (0, 1).
We also test whether it matters whether central bankers are in agreement on the topics which they discuss. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) We test for the effects by introducing indicators that measure disagreement as additional explanatory variables in (8). The model then reads as:
where D x t denotes the dispersion indicator on interest rates, inflation, economic growth and M3, respectively and t ∼ N (0, 1).
As a part of the analysis, we pay attention to the group of officials who make statements. Comments by certain officials may be more informative than comments by others. We can easily test for this by constructing communication indicators using only statements by certain groups of central bankers. we coded each comment on a ternary scale. We determined whether a variable is projected to go downwards, remain at its current level or go upwards. In the first case, the comment would receive a value of -1, in the second case it would receive a value of 0 and in the final case it would receive a value of +1.
Measures of ECB communication
For example, comments projecting lower levels of risk with respect to euro area inflation would receive a -1, statements with a positive outlook for economic growth would receive a +1, while comments suggesting constant interest rates would receive a 0.
Based on our ternary classification, we constructed a series of ECB signals per category on a daily basis as follows:
where n + τ denotes the number of statements with the value +1 on day τ , n − τ denotes the number of statements with the value -1, D denotes the number of days to the next interest decision and x is either interest rates, inflation, economic growth or M3. We multiply by the fraction 9.5 (D+1) to take into account that statements made closer to interest rate decisions may have more impact. Therefore, we divide by the distance to the next ECB interest decision. Subsequently, in order to re-scale, we multiply by the average number of days to a decision 4 .
To construct the indicators S x t , we first sum S x τ over the periods between interest rate decisions. As the periods between rate decisions were not of equal length in the sample, we divided the sum of the daily signals by the number of days between the time of the decision and the former decision. To re-scale, we multiply the result by the average number of days between rate decisions, the average being equal to 15.25. We calculated the indicators using all ECB comments on a particular topic 5 . In addition, we constructed the indicators for different groups of central bankers.
To measure disagreement in ECB communication, we use the dispersion indicator introduced in Jansen and De Haan (2006) 6 . The dispersion indicator is based on our ternary classification of all comments on a particular topic. We construct D x t as the total distance between the scores divided by the maximum total distance between the scores. Because the indicator is scaled on a maximum score, it has the attractive feature that it ranges between 0 (no disagreement) and 1 (complete disagreement). It can be calculated as follows:
where d equals 1 if n is odd and zero otherwise, x is either inflation, inflation, economic growth or M3 and n + t denotes the number of statements with the value +1 in inter-meeting periods, n − t denotes the number of statements with the value -1 and n 0 t denotes the number of statements with the value 0. For example, assume that in an inter-meeting period there were three comments by ECB officials on interest rates. Of these three comments, one suggests higher rates are to be expected, whereas the other two are neutral. The scores in this case would be 1, 0 and 0. In the example, the total distance between the statements equals 2 and, as the maximum total distance equals 4, D i t equals 0.5. Once again, we compute the indicator for different groups of central bankers.
prevent that we have to divide by zero, we add 1 to D. The average number of days to decisions is actually 8.5, but here we also added the 1.
5 On a priori grounds, we prefer to take the timing of the statement into account when constructing the indicator. The patterns of the indicators are very similar if we do not weigh by the distance to the next decision or the number of days between decisions. 6 This indicator is also used in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) . Figure 1 shows the development in the ECB main refinancing rate (solid line) and the signal indicator on interest rates (column) over the sample period.
The dates shown correspond to ECB rate changes. In some cases, the signal and the decision corresponded perfectly. For example, the signal indicator for the meeting on 3 February 2000 has a value of 13. At this meeting, interest rates were increased by 25 basis points. However, in other cases, the correspondence is far from perfect. Figure 2 shows the relationship between dispersion in communication on interest rates (column) and the main refinancing rate (solid line).
In most cases, when there is disagreement among central bankers, the dispersion indicator is equal to or higher than 0.50. Disagreement is mostly visible in 1999 and the first half of 2000 and towards the end of the sample period. To estimate the Taylor rule models, we use monthly euro area data on inflation, industrial production (excluding construction) and money growth as published in the ECB monthly bulletin 8 . We take data on ECB policy decisions from the ECB web-site. We choose the monthly bulletin as a data source in order to approximate the information available to policy makers at the time of their decisions as closely as possible (see also Coenen, Levin and Wieland (2005) and Sauer and Sturm (2006) (2004) and Sauer and Sturm (2006) ). The ESI is based on confidence indicators for consumers, the retail sector, the construction sector and the manufacturing sector. In the case of the ESI, we use data obtained from the European Commission web-site 9 . We use the difference between the value of the ESI in a particular month and a long-term average. The long-term average is calculated using a rolling window consisting of the 144 preceding months. Table 2 shows full sample results for the ordered probit models. Columns (1) and (2) show results for our two specifications of the Taylor rule, where the first column uses data on industrial production and the second column uses the sentiment indicator. The coefficients are comparable for both specifications.
Results for ordered probit regressions
The coefficient for HICP inflation is between 1.16 and 1.26 and significant at the 10 % level in both cases. The coefficient for both industrial production and the ESI are highly significant (p < 0.01). The coefficient for the lagged level of the refinancing rate is negative and significant, which points to smoothing in interest rate setting. Finally, the pseudo-R 2 equals 0.25 for the first model and 0.38 for the second model. If we replace the variables in the Taylor specification by communication variables, we find, firstly, that the fit of the model deteriorates substantially: the pseudo-R 2 drops to 0.10 (column (3)). Furthermore, the only variable for which we find a significant coefficient is the ECB signal on interest rates. If we condition the results on the level of dispersion (column (4)), the fit of the model improves, albeit slightly, to 0.17. Our estimate for the coefficient of the signal on interest rates is comparable to the one we found before, but now, in addition, we find a significant coefficient for the dispersion indicator on economic growth. However, this model based on communication has a worse fit than both Taylor rule models. Table 3 shows estimation results for groups of central bankers. We show results for EB members (column (1) and (2)), NCB presidents (columns (3) and (4)) and Bundesbank officials (columns (5) and (6)). We show estimates with and without dispersion indicators. When comparing these estimates, we find that in all three cases the fit of the model is better when we include both signal and dispersion indicators 10 . For the EB members and the NCB presidents, this is due to the dispersion indicator on economic growth, whereas for the EB members the dispersion indicator on interest rates is also significant. Comparing the models for the different groups, we find the best fit for the EB members and the Bundesbank officials. In both cases, this is mainly due to the signal indicator on interest rates, which are highly significant in both cases. For the NCB presidents, none of the signal indicators is significantly different from zero at the 10 % level. To test for the effects of dispersion, we performed likelihood ratio tests.
The unrestricted models are specifications with signal and dispersion indicators, whereas the restricted model restricts the coefficients for one or all of the dispersion indicators to be equal to zero. Table 4 has results. Firstly, except for the case of the EB members, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the three coefficients of the dispersion indicators are different from zero. However, if we only test for the dispersion indicator on growth, the story changes. Now, the Bundesbank is the only case for which we cannot reject the null. For the full sample and the NCB presidents we reject the null, whereas for the EB members we can reject the null that none of the three indicators matter. In other words, disagreement can be linked to interest rate decisions, especially if the differences of opinion concern the economic outlook. This is further corroborated by studying marginal effects. Table 5 shows results for three specifications: the Taylor rule with industrial production, the Taylor rates. In this case, the sign of the effect is consistent with expectations: a higher interest rate indicator has a positive effect on the probability of an interest rate rise and a negative effect on the probability of an interest rate lowering.
Concerning the dispersion indicators, we only find a significant effect for the indicator on economic growth. The sign of the effect is, once again, noteworthy:
higher dispersion on growth increases the probability of a lower interest rate and decreases the probability of higher interest rates.
Evaluating predictive power
To what extent are the estimated models able to re-produce the timing and the nature of ECB interest rate decisions? To examine this, we determine the decision with the highest level of probability according to our model and compare this prediction with the actual outcome. Table 6 has the full sample results,   while table 7 has group results. The second column of both tables lists the actual distribution of rate decisions during the sample period. Under the heading distribution, we list the distribution of the predicted decisions. Under the heading % correct, we list the fraction of correctly predicted decisions, correctly predicted changes and correctly predicted downward and upward changes.
What emerges from tables 6 and 7 is the inability of our models to predict downward interest rate changes. Almost without exception, the models do not predict any downward changes, and, as a result, predict none of the 5 downward changes correctly. The most balanced and, for that matter, accurate model is the Taylor rule model using the ESI data (table 6, column 4). The model predicts both downward and upward changes. In all, it predicts 1 out of 3 changes correctly. Why are upward rate changes more predictable? Figure 1 may hold the explanation. There are more positive signals than negative signals.
Moreover, the positive signals are larger in absolute value. In general, it is easier for a central bank to lower rates than to raise them. It would, therefore, be likely that this is reflected in more active communication before upward interest rate changes. During the first years of EMU, this explanation seems to be true for the ECB. 
where x is either interest rates, inflation, economic growth or money supply.
We interpret the predicted values from this regression,Ŝ x t , as the part of communication which is driven by recent macroeconomic developments. It is the communication that an observer of the ECB would expect on the basis of the state of the economy. We use the residuals as a measure for the part of communication which is not a reflection of economic developments. We use both measures in an ordered probit framework. First, we study effects of the predicted values on interest decisions using the following index function:
Next, we estimate an ordered probit model using the residuals from (12):
where ψ x t denote the residuals for interest rates, inflation, output and M3, respectively. Using (13) and (14) we can assess which part of communication is informative by assessing the significance of the coefficients. inflation and money growth do not seems to be significant determinants of the signal. Table 9 presents the results for the ordered probit model based on (13), while table 10 presents the results for estimating the model based on (14). The contrast is striking. 
Conclusions
This paper studies the relationship between central bank communication and subsequent interest rate decisions using comments by euro area central bankers.
In contrast to the proverb, we find that a word to the wise is not enough. Finally, we show that the ECB used communication more actively when upward interest rate changes were concerned. This is rationalized by the fact that downward interest rate changes will, in all likelihood, receive a warmer welcome from the public than upward changes. It would be interesting to study this issue in more detail for other major central banks, such as the US Federal
Reserve or the Bank of England.
